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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HOPE VI AND TITLE VIII: HOW A JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT
PURPOSE CAN OVERCOME THE DISPARATE IMPACT PROBLEM1

Gone are the infamous old housing blocks of East Lake
Meadows, a place that was so violent people called it “Little
Vietnam.” . . .
[T]he transformation at East Lake is truly astounding. . . .
The people enjoying this community, by and large, are
not the same people who lived here before. This is a “mixed
income” development now. . . .
By every measure these new communities are better
places to live.
But there’s a nagging issue that’s often overlooked in the
enthusiasm for renewal. If most of the previous tenants don’t
live here, where did they all go?2
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade the Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s (“HUD”) HOPE VI program has been used to revitalize
distressed public housing developments all over the country.
While
proponents argue that HOPE VI has been a great success in improving the lives
of public housing residents and addressing the problems associated with
distressed public housing developments, critics point out that many residents
have been displaced by the revitalization activity and that HOPE VI demolition
has contributed to the nation’s dwindling supply of affordable housing units.3
In overwhelming numbers, those who have been directly affected by HOPE VI
revitalization activities are members of protected classes under Title VIII of the

1. Two key experiences in the past year have afforded me a glimpse of both the rewards
and frustrations associated with the now decade-old HOPE VI program. First, in the summer of
2002, I spent three months as an intern with McCormack Baron and Associates, a St. Louis,
Missouri-based firm nationally recognized as a leader in the development of low and moderate
income housing. Specifically, the firm has experience working with several cities to implement
HOPE VI revitalization projects. Second, in the fall of 2002, I spent three months working in the
Saint Louis University Legal Clinic, which represented a tenant association that filed a lawsuit in
opposition to a HOPE VI plan.
2. Christopher Swope, Rehab Refugees, GOVERNING MAG., May 2001, at 40-41, available
at http://www.governing.com/archive/2001/may/housing.txt (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
3. See discussion infra Part IV.
1277
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Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“Fair Housing Act” or “FHA”).4 Under the FHA,
specified class members are granted certain protections to further the goal of
“provid[ing], within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States.”5 Recent attempts to halt HOPE VI revitalization activities
under the theory that the implementation violates the FHA highlights a
potential conflict between the HOPE VI policy of revitalization and the FHA
mandate to further fair housing throughout the United States.6 Importantly,
attempts to reconcile the HOPE VI program with the FHA presents problems
that reveal the broader tension with which policy makers must grapple. Under
the FHA, HUD must affirmatively further fair housing, which prohibits it from
taking actions that result in a discriminatory effect. At the same time, HUD is
directed to carry out the “sound development of the Nation’s communities,”7
and “spur[] economic growth in distressed neighborhoods.”8 As highlighted
throughout this Note, these goals often conflict. Although this Note focuses on
the particular FHA issues likely to occur within the HOPE VI context, it is
essential to recognize that the tension explored here is one that also arises
outside of the HOPE VI context.9
This Note explores the potential conflict between HOPE VI revitalization
policies and the FHA by examining the major components of the HOPE VI
program within the context of FHA claims likely to be made in response to a
revitalization plan. Following a brief overview of past U.S. housing policy in
Part II, Part III of this Note highlights the potential FHA problems that arise in
the HOPE VI context. Next, Part IV provides a brief overview of current
HOPE VI policies, which are then analyzed under the FHA in Part V. The
FHA analysis ultimately concludes that some level of disproportionate impact
is probably unavoidable due to the racial and gender characteristics of current
public housing tenants; therefore, the determinative question centers on
whether there is sufficient justification for the harm the revitalization activity
will likely impose. This Note argues that, although each plan must be
examined on a case-by-case basis, defenders of a given HOPE VI plan can
provide one of several possible justifications sufficient to overcome a prima

4. See discussion infra Parts III, V.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
6. See discussion infra Parts II, IV.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (2000).
8. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mission & History, at
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/mission.cfm (last visited February 5, 2003).
9. This reality means that even if the HOPE VI program is eliminated as proposed by
President George W. Bush’s Fiscal Year 2004 Budget, the tension highlighted here will
undoubtedly arise in the context of successor housing policies and programs. For a summary of
Bush’s proposal, see Department of Housing and Urban Development, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/budget-fiscalyear2004/hud.html (last visited February
5, 2003).
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facie showing of disparate impact. The sources of such justification include
the goals of integrated living patterns, urban revitalization, self-sufficiency,
and efficiency. In Part VI, this Note ultimately concludes that the HOPE VI
program and the FHA can legitimately coexist, but that important
modifications to the program are needed in order to diminish the probability
that future FHA litigation will occur.
II. Brief History of U.S. Housing Policy
The 1937 Wagner-Steagall Act (“United States Housing Act of 1937” or
“the 1937 Housing Act”)10 is generally recognized as marking the federal
government’s first large-scale entry into the housing market.11 The goals of
this Depression-era legislation were to encourage the creation of jobs, to act as
a slum clearance plan, and to provide for affordable housing.12 These goals
were to be accomplished by providing financial assistance to the states to
“remedy the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low-income.”13 The
conventional public housing program sought to provide temporary shelter
within a larger public welfare system intended to prepare entry-level workers
for industrial and service employment.14 Local public housing authorities
(“PHAs”) worked to construct public housing developments all across the
country, much of which remains a viable housing resource for low-income
families.15 In later years, new public housing developments came in the form
10. Wagner-Steagall Housing Act, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (2000)).
11. There are other examples of lesser levels of government support of housing before the
1937 Housing Act. For example, the First World War brought legislation that authorized the
federal government to “build[] housing for factory workers involved in the war effort . . . .
remov[ing] the barrier between the federal government and the private housing market.” Further,
the 1920s brought some state efforts to create new housing for the urban poor, such as the
“Lowell Homes” in Massachusetts. See Michael S. FitzPatrick, A Disaster in Every Generation:
An Analysis of HOPE VI: HUD’s Newest Big Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 421, 424-25 (2000).
12. Wagner-Steagall Housing Act, 50 Stat. 888 (announcing the goals of the program to be
employment, slum clearance, and housing).
13. Id. One commentator noted: “The 1937 Housing Act . . . acknowledged federal
responsibility for providing housing for the poor but linked this social purpose to . . . a mandate to
create jobs through public works and stimulate the economy. . . . [P]ublic housing also served the
purposes of national mobilization [in that it could provide] inexpensive housing within easy
walking distance of the factories” producing war-related items. Harry J. Wexler, HOPE VI:
Market Means/Public Ends—The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm Lesson’s of HUD’s Urban
Revitalization Demonstration Program, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
195, 199 (2001).
14. Wexler, supra note 13, at 199.
15. See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED
PUBLIC HOUSING 38 (1992) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (noting that “[m]ost PHAs do not
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of high-rise structures intended to house a great number of occupants in a
relatively small amount of space.16 This high-density public housing stock
rapidly deteriorated because of a host of factors including poor site location
decisions, an inability to meet operating costs, and poor management, among
other problems.17 These problems were compounded by the fact that such
developments were often left increasingly isolated as the jobs and
infrastructure necessary to help residents move out of poverty continued to
leave the cities.18 Discrimination in the administration of the public housing
program plagued public housing, a problem that HUD finally attempted to
rectify during the 1970s when it “imposed site selection standards . . . that
prevented PHAs from building new family developments in neighborhoods
with high concentrations of low-income minority residents.”19
In the 1970s, a new form of federal housing subsidy, known as Section 8,
was introduced in an “attempt[] to move away from the perceived failures of
the public housing program.”20 This new subsidy shifted construction and
management responsibilities to the private market.21 The program created both
project-based and tenant-based subsidies. The project-based subsidy provided
incentives for “developers to create private housing” reserved for low-income
families, while the tenant-based subsidy provided tenants with a voucher to be
used to pay for housing in the private market.22 The 1980s brought drastic
decreases in funding for housing programs, as well as a shattered public image
for HUD because of HUD officials’ improper use of funds.23 By the end of the
decade the country was generally left with a deteriorated physical stock of
public housing, housing developments suffering from deteriorated
management practices, and a deteriorated relationship between PHAs and the
residents they were established to serve.24 Though the federal government

contain severely distressed public housing developments” and that “approximately 94% of the
public housing stock does not appear to be severely distressed”).
16. FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 431.
17. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 198 (discussing various factors contributing to the
increased distress of public housing including urban poverty, drug-related crime, shortsighted
federal regulations, poor and discriminatory location decisions, rules that destroyed the financial
viability of large projects, excessively high density, and poor property management).
18. FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 430.
19. Wexler, supra note 13, at 200. Wexler notes that, because “HUD . . . lacked the
authority . . . to override local opposition to the placement of public housing in working and
middle class neighborhoods . . . . the unintended consequence of the HUD’s site selection
standards was effectively to stop the development of new family public housing in most cities,”
despite the increasing need for affordable housing. Id.
20. FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 431-32.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 432.
23. Id.
24. Wexler, supra note 13, at 200-01.
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generally withdrew support for most subsidized housing programs during this
decade, it did initiate the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”) program
that created incentives for the private development and rehabilitation of
housing reserved for low-income households.25
The current HOPE VI program is perhaps best viewed as a response to the
need for reform and redefinition of the government’s role in responding to the
affordable housing crisis.26 In fact, outside of the subsidies provided through
the Section 8 and LIHTC programs, HOPE VI currently represents the only
significant direct federal funding for the construction of new affordable
housing units.27 The program was created as part of the response to a report by
the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (“the
Commission”),28 which had been charged with proposing a National Action
Plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing.29 The 1992 Final Report
recommended revitalization in three general areas: physical improvements,
management improvements, and social and community services designed to
address residents’ needs.30 The thrust of the recommendation was that the six
percent of the nation’s 1.4 million existing public housing dwellings that were
“severely distressed”31 should be eradicated by the year 2000.32 In response to
these findings, HUD created the Urban Revitalization Demonstration project,

25. Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax
Credit Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1998). Roisman
noted further that “[t]he LIHTC program allows owners of residential rental property to claim tax
credits . . . for 30% to 70% of the present value of new and substantially rehabilitated housing
developments. [A] project qualifies for the credit only if . . . the owner rents at least 20% of the
units” to low-income households. Id. at 1014.
26. Wexler contended that policy makers considered two approaches to reform: (1)
traditional reform, which advocates major funding to physically revitalize “severely distressed
public housing and to overhaul troubled PHA’s, leaving unchanged the basic public housing
model as conceived in 1937”, and (2) structural reform, which emphasizes the introduction of
practices from the private sector, shifting responsibility for correcting problems to private
developers and property managers who are given more discretion and flexibility than what has
been traditionally given to PHAs. Wexler, supra note 13, at 201. Wexler argues that reformers
attempted to combine these approaches through the HOPE VI program. Id.
27. FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 423.
28. Congress created this Commission by enacting the Department of Housing and Urban
Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-235, 103 Stat. 1987 (1989). See FINAL
REPORT, supra note 15, at xiii.
29. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at xiii.
30. See id. at 9-33.
31. The Commission’s work resulted in four measures of “severe distress:” (1) physical
deterioration and unacceptable living conditions; (2) families living in distress facing problems
associated with poverty; (3) high incidence of serious crime, and (4) management difficulties
evidenced by high vacancy rates, move-out rates, transfer requests, and low levels of rent
collection. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at B-3.
32. Id. at 2.
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which later became known as HOPE VI.33 This program essentially makes
federal grants available to local PHAs to revitalize their “severely distressed”
public housing. The program operated pursuant to annual appropriations from
fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1998,34 finally receiving multi-year
authorization beginning in fiscal year 1999 under the Quality Housing and
Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (“Housing Reform Act of 1998”).35
Congress has appropriated funds each fiscal year since the inception of the
program,36 with the most recent appropriation ensuring that funding remains
33. FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 435-36. HOPE VI was created by the Departments of
Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571, which was approved on October 6, 1992.
34. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Hope VI Program Authority and
Funding History, at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/history.cfm (last
visited Jan. 18, 2003). From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1998, Congress provided annual
appropriations ranging from $300,000,000 to $778,240,000 per year. See infra note 36.
35. Veterans Affairs and HUD Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 535, 112 Stat. 2518, 2518 (1998)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 v (a)(3)) [hereinafter Housing Reform Act of 1998]
was the first major piece of public housing legislation enacted since 1992 and makes substantial
changes to the United States Housing Act of 1937. See Eileen M. Greenbaum, Quality Housing
and Work Responsibility Act of 1998: Its Major Impact on Development of Public Housing, 8 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 310 (1999). Some argue that the Act only
accelerates a disturbing trend toward the demolition of thousands of affordable units, leading to
tenant relocation and a reduced supply of an already insufficient number of affordable housing
units.
See, e.g., Center for Community Change, Public Housing Overhaul, at
http://www.communitychange.org/pahcrisis2.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Public
Housing Overhaul] (arguing that tenants have been forced to relocate and that the Act reduces the
supply of affordable housing). For a brief explanation of how the Housing Reform Act of 1998
impacted the HOPE VI program, see Department of Housing and Urban Development, Hope VI
Program Authority and Funding History, at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/
about/history.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
36. The first appropriation for HOPE VI came in fiscal year 1993, in which funding was
made available to up to fifteen cities that were to be selected from either the forty most populous
cities or the troubled housing authority list. Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development and Independent Agencies, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1992).
Under HUD’s annual appropriations acts, HOPE VI continued to be funded and the program
continued to be modified, with later bills allowing for an increased number of applicants and an
increased level of funding. See 106 Stat. 1571 ($300,000,000 appropriated); Department of
Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-124, 107 Stat. 1275 (1993) ($778,240,000 appropriated);
Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-327, 108 Stat. 2298 (1994) ($500,000,000 appropriated);
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1995) ($480,000,000 appropriated); Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban
Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat.
2874 (1996) ($550,000,000 appropriated); Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-65, 111
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available through September 30, 2003.37 At the time of this writing, President
George W. Bush has proposed that the HOPE VI program not be reauthorized,
making the future of the current program an uncertain one as policy makers
debate whether the program will continue.38 Due to its unique legislative
history, HOPE VI is governed by a series of statutes and regulations, including
appropriations bills, guidelines contained in each year’s Notice of Funding
Availability (“NOFA”), and the provision found in the Housing Reform Act of
1998.39 Viewed together, these sources that govern HOPE VI reveal a
program that, in many ways, fundamentally differs from past housing policy.
The competitive HOPE VI application process is guided by the ranking
structure outlined in each periodic NOFA. Applicant proposals are scrutinized
under this structure to determine which will be awarded the limited number of
available grants. Through this process, each applicant must design a
revitalization plan that will meet the program’s basic threshold requirements
and garner the most additional points in order to earn the highest possible
ranking. The HOPE VI program highlights the tension HUD faces in
complying with its dual goals of furthering fair housing and revitalizing
distressed communities.
III. HOPE VI AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Federal law imposes various obligations on HUD as the federal
administrator of the HOPE VI program. Perhaps the most fundamental
obligation is that found in the civil rights era legislation commonly known as
the Fair Housing Act.40 The FHA mandates that HUD “administer the

Stat. 1344 (1997) ($550,000,000 appropriated); Veterans Affairs and HUD Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998) ($600,000,000 appropriated); Appropriations, 2000—
Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent
Agencies, Pub. L. No. 106-74, 113 Stat. 1047 (1999) ($575,000,000 appropriated); Departments
of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development—Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 106-377,
114 Stat. 1441 (2000) ($575,000,000 appropriated); Departments of Veterans Affairs and
Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
107-73, 115 Stat. 651 (2001) ($573,735,000 appropriated).
37. Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-73, 115 Stat 651 (2001).
38. On November 15, 2002, the House passed a bill that would reauthorize the HOPE VI
program through fiscal year 2004. However, the bill did not come for a vote in the Senate. See
HOPE VI Program Reauthorization Act of 2002, H.R. 5499, 107th Cong. (2002); Congress
Adjourns, 7 NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION MEMO TO MEMBERS 46 (Nov. 22, 2002),
at http://www.nlihc.org/mtm/mtm7-46.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003). For a more complete
discussion of this bill’s provisions, see infra Part VI. See also supra note 9.
39. FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 437.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000). Note that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 added
significant provisions to the original statutory language, expanding the protections against
discrimination to persons with disabilities and families with children.
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programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner
affirmatively to further the policies” of the FHA.41 The dual goals of the FHA
are to promote integration and to prohibit discrimination (including both
intentional discrimination and actions that have a discriminatory effect)42 in the
nation’s housing.43 Pursuant to the mandate to affirmatively further fair
housing, HUD must use its grant programs to assist in ending segregation and
discrimination.44 In light of these obligations, HOPE VI projects must be
carefully evaluated to determine whether they pass FHA scrutiny. While
HOPE VI projects bring significant possibilities for the transformation of
severely distressed public housing neighborhoods into healthy, mixed-income
communities, these benefits do not come without significant costs. For
instance, HOPE VI demolition has contributed to the nation’s dwindling stock
of affordable housing units,45 and some argue that its policies have abandoned
the poorest residents in favor of the less desperate.46 The fact that most public
housing residents whose suffering justified the revitalization activities do not
return after the revitalization has been completed has been widely

41. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2000).
42. See discussion infra Part IV.
43. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
44. See, e.g., NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155
(1st Cir. 1987).
45. “During the past three decades, the focus of federal low-income housing policy has
shifted away from constructing new public housing projects toward housing vouchers, subsidies
for privately-owned buildings, and tax credits for private production of new low-income
housing.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Is the Proposed Cut to the Public Housing
Capital Fund Justified? (Sept. 26, 2002), at http://www.cbpp.org/9-18-02hous.htm. Pursuant to
the Housing Reform Act of 1998, PHAs can apply to HUD to demolish public housing units if the
agency can show that the housing is obsolete, too costly to rehabilitate, or that demolition would
be in the best interest of the tenants. See Public Housing Overhaul, supra note 35. There is
evidence that policy makers are concerned about this net loss of affordable housing stock. For
example, the Senate Appropriations Committee has rejected HUD’s proposal for a voluntary
conversion of public housing to project-based voucher assistance because of its concern that such
action will likely result in the net loss of public housing units. Joseph P. Poduska, Senate
Banking Committee Approves 2003 HUD Appropriations Bill; Supplemental Sent to President, 30
NO. CD-7 HDR CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (Aug. 5, 2002). This same committee, in
reauthorizing the HOPE VI program for another year, expressed its concern about the future of
the program, noting that HUD has approved the demolition of 140,000 housing units since the
HOPE VI program was implemented. Id. Though some of these units have been or are
scheduled to be replaced, a significant number will remain forever lost. See Swope, supra note 2
(explaining that, in the 1990s, approximately 100,000 units were demolished and approximately
60,000 were scheduled to be replaced).
46. See, e.g., Swope, supra note 2; Public Housing Overhaul, supra note 35 (arguing that the
new trends in housing policy afford PHAs more opportunity to evict the poorest tenants in favor
of renting to higher income residents).
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recognized,47 though its implications are disputed. Proponents maintain that
the low return rate is explained by the fact that former residents have exercised
their right to choose to live elsewhere, while critics argue that the low return
rate is because fewer units are being built and that more stringent screening
imposes a limit on the number of people who can return to a redeveloped site.48
This debate raises legitimate questions regarding the impact of the program on
the public housing residents and neighborhoods HOPE VI is intended to
benefit.49
Embedded within this policy debate exists a more narrow legal problem
that must be addressed. The widespread displacement of FHA-protected class
members raises concerns about whether the implementation of HOPE VI
projects violates the FHA mandate that the federal government affirmatively
further fair housing. This legal issue is reflected in the fact that some public
housing tenants themselves have organized in opposition to HOPE VI
revitalization projects50 and that members of the legal community have spoken
out about possible FHA violations.51 Various legal claims have been brought
in response to HOPE VI plans—some of these allege a violation of the Fair
Housing Act,52 and others allege violations of different federal laws.53 Though
47. See, e.g., Swope, supra note 2; Wexler, supra note 13, at 197 (asking “How does a
HOPE VI team build a sustainable mixed income community without discouraging or excluding
substantial numbers of low income residents from remaining or returning to the site? If some
level of exclusion is unavoidable, how can HUD ensure that displaced residents will be able to
use section 8 vouchers and certificates to find decent housing in accepting and acceptable
communities elsewhere?”).
48. See, e.g., Swope, supra note 2.
49. HUD is asking cities to assess the local impact on people and neighborhoods. See
Swope, supra note 2 (noting that HUD has directed cities to assess the impact of HOPE VI
projects). Furthermore, a recent HOPE VI appropriation act directs the Urban Institute to conduct
an independent study on the long-term effects of HOPE VI on former residents of distressed
public housing developments. Appropriations, 2000—Departments of Veterans Affairs and
Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies, Pub. L. No. 106-74, 113 Stat. 1047
(1999).
50. See, e.g., Cabrini-Green Local Advisory Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 1997 WL 31002
(N.D. Ill.); Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. Saint Louis Hous. Auth., 202 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D.
Mo. 2001); Reese v. Miami-Dade County, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
51. For example, the executive director for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law has expressed the view that HOPE VI has resulted in the loss of a considerable number of
public housing units and the displacement of their mostly African-American and Hispanic
occupants, thereby evidencing HUD’s failure to affirmatively further fair housing, and the ACLU
has called for a formalized fair housing review of HOPE VI projects before they are approved.
See Finance, Management and Development of Fair Housing, 30 NO. CD-5 HDR CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 24 (July 8, 2002) (quoting Barbara Arnwine, Executive Director of the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and Philip Tegeler, Connecticut Civil Liberties Union
Legal Director, representing the ACLU).
52. See, e.g., Cabrini-Green, 1997 WL 31002; Darst-Webbe, 202 F. Supp. 2d 938.
53. See, e.g., Reese, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1324.
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there are various theories of FHA liability that might be used to oppose a
HOPE VI plan,54 the theory most likely to be relied upon is that of disparate
impact. 55 A disparate impact claim may be brought under the theory that the
facially—neutral policy has a disproportionate adverse impact on those who
are members of FHA-protected classes.56 Before considering the complexities
of this type of challenge, it is necessary to understand the major components of
the current HOPE VI program.
IV. MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENT HOPE VI PROGRAM57
A central purpose of the HOPE VI grant program is to help PHAs
“improve the living environment for public housing residents of severely
distressed public housing projects through the demolition, rehabilitation,
reconfiguration, or replacement” of at least some portion of the public housing
project.58 Therefore, a foremost requirement of the HOPE VI grant process is
that the public housing in question be “severely distressed.” The criteria used
to identify severely distressed public housing developments were originally
recommended by the Commission59 and have since been refined and codified.
Under the Housing Reform Act of 1998, a severely distressed project is one
that: (1) requires major redesign or other activity to correct serious design or
other physical deficiencies; (2) is a significant contributing factor to physical

54. For example, a possible theory of liability that is outside the scope of this Note is that
implementation of the revitalization plan reinforces patterns of segregation by leaving a great
many minority families without replacement housing in the newly revitalized neighborhood,
largely resulting in their move to non-racially integrated areas. See, e.g., Cabrini-Green, 1997
WL 31002 at *12 (reading the complaint to allege that “because the Cabrini residents will be
denied housing in their newly revitalized neighborhood and because those residents have very
low incomes, they will be forced to live in a non-racially integrated area” and noting this to be an
adequately alleged violation of the FHA); Darst-Webbe, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 939 n.1 (noting
plaintiffs’ allegation that HUD’s failure to affirmatively further fair housing consigns the
displaced households to live in racially segregated public housing developments).
55. See, e.g., Darst-Webbe, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 939 n.1 (explaining the allegations against the
Saint Louis Housing Authority, which included denial of housing and discrimination because of
race, sex, and familial status); Cabrini-Green, 1997 WL 31002 at *12-13 (holding that the
plaintiffs had adequately alleged violations of the FHA in regard to their discrimination claims).
56. Under the FHA, it is illegal to discriminate based on a person’s race, national origin,
color, religion, sex, disability, or familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000).
57. The brief overview of the major HOPE VI components that follows is not intended to
provide a complete explanation of every facet of the program. For a more complete discussion of
the HOPE VI program, see FitzPatrick, supra note 11, and Wexler, supra note 13.
58. Department of Housing and Urban Development Notice of Funding Availability for
Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public Housing HOPE VI Revitalization Grants; Fiscal
Year 2002; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,766, (Part I (A)(1)) (July 31, 2002) [hereinafter “July 2002
NOFA”].
59. For a list of the Commission’s original criteria, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at B3.
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decline and disinvestment in the surrounding neighborhood; (3) is occupied
predominantly by very poor families with children whose parents are
unemployed and dependent on public assistance or has high rates of vandalism
and criminal activity in comparison to other housing in the area; (4) cannot be
revitalized through other programs because of costs and funding constraints,
and (5) to the extent the project contemplates work on an individual building,
that building is sufficiently separable.60 A project that has been legally vacated
or demolished, but for which there has been no replacement housing assistance
other than Section 8 assistance, can also qualify as severely distressed.61 If the
project is determined to be severely distressed and is granted HOPE VI funds,
the grant recipient may use the funds to carry out a variety of revitalization
activities.62
A.

Creating Mixed-Income Communities

The Commission noted that families living in public housing “often face
adverse conditions such as a lack of social and support services . . . and a lack
of employment opportunities” within a physical environment that “often has a
high concentration of very low income families living on a relatively small
site.”63 It further noted that these families share the common socioeconomic
characteristics of low education levels, low employment rates, and low
household incomes.64 This concern is reflected in the HOPE VI goal of
providing for a “mixed-income, well functioning community on the revitalized
site.”65 It is expected that the HOPE VI revitalization will help to improve the
surrounding neighborhood and build a sustainable community.66 Ultimately,
this is done through a plan that “[p]rovide[s] housing that will avoid or
decrease the concentration of very low-income families.”67 A reduction in
concentration does not necessarily entail a reduction in the number of housing
units; the redeveloped community may actually have a higher density,
depending on the site’s market conditions.68 Because market rate and public
housing units exist side-by-side, HOPE VI developments are characteristically

60. Housing Reform Act of 1998, supra note 35, at sec. 535, § 24(j)(2)(A).
61. Id. at § 24(j)(2)(B).
62. These activities include resident relocation, demolition, sale or lease of the site,
rehabilitation of community facilities, development activity, homeownership activity, acquisition,
management improvements, administrative costs, community and supportive services, and
leveraging other resources. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,768-69 (Part V).
63. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at B-3.
64. Id.
65. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,783 (Part XIV(A)).
66. Id. at 49,766 (Part I(A)(2)&(4)).
67. Id. at 49,766 (Part I(A)(3)). See also FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 438; Pub. L. No. 104134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1995).
68. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,783 (Part XIV(A)).
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designed in a way that enables them to blend into their larger community so as
to avoid the historical stigma associated with public housing.69 Some argue
that reducing the concentration of very low income, minority families on
public housing sites will lessen the “concentration effects” that have led to an
increase in social isolation for public housing residents.70 While these
proponents view mixed-income housing as an antidote to the negative
conditions created by social and economic isolation,71 critics view a policy that
fosters mixed-income developments as a waste of resources.72 Mixed-income
developments are further encouraged by the relatively recent shift in public
housing income targets, which require that only 40% of all new admissions to
public housing must have an income that does not exceed 30% of the area
median income.73
B.

Replacement Housing

Traditional public housing policy required that for every unit of public
housing demolished by a PHA, another unit had to be built in its place.74 This
69. Wexler, supra note 13, at 206. This new design philosophy is known as New Urbanism,
which promotes the idea that development occur within compact neighborhoods that encourage
pedestrian activity with a wide spectrum of housing types that allow for diverse income levels
and a mix of activities. Id. at 207. Public housing units within a mixed-finance development
“must be comparable in size, location, external appearance, and distribution to the non-public
housing units within the development.” 24 C.F.R. § 941.600(b) (2002).
70. Wexler, supra note 13, at 203 (explaining the work of William Julius Wilson).
71. Cited benefits of mixed-income developments include: (1) higher-income residents
provide new social norms that emphasize work and abiding by the law; (2) low income
households will have the benefit of better schools, jobs, and safety, and (3) institutions are more
likely to invest in a mixed-income neighborhood. Id. at 204-205.
72. Id. at 205. The chief criticism of a policy that encourages mixed-income communities is
that scarce public resources should be allocated to those most in need. These critics argue that
HOPE VI permits PHAs to use scarce resources to attract working and middle class residents to
mixed-income developments at the expense of those in need of assisted housing. Id.
73. Housing Reform Act of 1998, supra note 35, at sec. 513 § 16(a). Previously, the
minimum percentage of residents who had to have incomes at or below 30% of the area median
had been 75%. See Susan Bennett, The Possibility of a Beloved Place: Residents and
Placemaking in Public Housing Communities, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 259, 279 (2000). In
the past, public housing admission preferences were for the lowest income households as defined
in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, such as those in substandard housing,
homeless, living in shelters, involuntarily displaced, or paying more than 50% of their income for
shelter. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 200 n.6. Under the Act, the PHA’s admission policy must
be designed to deconcentrate poverty and promote income-mixing. See Greenbaum, supra note
35, at 330.
74. This rule is found in numerous HUD regulations. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 42.375 (“All
occupied and vacant occupiable lower-income dwelling units that are demolished or converted to
a use other than as lower-income dwelling units in connection with an assisted activity must be
replaced with comparable lower-income dwelling units.”). See also Wexler, supra note 13, at
202.
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policy is often referred to as the one-for-one replacement requirement. In its
Final Report, the Commission noted that the one-for-one replacement
requirement often forced PHAs to retain problematic high density buildings
that contributed to distressed conditions because it would be too costly or
impractical to demolish and replace every lost unit.75 The initial HOPE VI
appropriation bills suspended this requirement for HOPE VI projects, and this
suspension was made permanent with the passage of the Housing Reform Act
of 1998.76 In general, replacement units may now consist of some combination
of public housing units, Section 8 certificates, and eligible homeownership
units.77 As a part of the application process, a PHA may request Section 8
vouchers to relocate residents affected by the revitalization78 and to serve as
replacement units for all units that will be “demolished, sold, or otherwise
disposed of” and that will not be replaced under the plan.79 As might be
expected, the discontinuance of the one-for-one replacement requirement has
been quite controversial, with critics arguing that it has led to the aggregate
loss of public housing units across the country.80
C. Mixed-Financing
Another significant hallmark of the HOPE VI structure is its provisions for
encouraging mixed-finance developments. HOPE VI grant money is intended
to be used to leverage significant levels of other public and private investment.
Financing techniques typically involve partnerships with resident and
community groups, local government, and foundations.81 The mixed-finance
75. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 79.
76. Greenbaum, supra note 35, at 314. Severely distressed housing projects can now be
demolished without obtaining funding to replace each lost unit. Id.
77. The first appropriation bill for HOPE VI provided that units demolished pursuant to the
program could be replaced by one-third Section 8 certificates, with the balance to be replaced by
a combination of conventional public housing and units acquired through a host of other
programs. Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1992). Under the July 2002 NOFA, a
replacement unit is deemed to be any combination of public housing rental units, eligible
homeownership units, and Section 8 vouchers. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,771 (Part
VI(8)).
78. See July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,768 (Part III(B)(22)) (“An application must
include a certification that the applicant has completed a HOPE VI Revitalization Relocation Plan
and that the Relocation Plan is in compliance with the Uniform Relocation Act”); id. at 49,780
(Part XII) (explaining that residents relocated under a revitalization plan are covered by the
acquisition policies and relocation requirements of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970).
79. Id. at 49,767 (Part II(E)(6)&(7)).
80. See Greenbaum, supra note 35, at 314.
81. Financing sources may include federal programs, tax-exempt financing, conventional
loans, pension funds, foundation loans and grants, and equity from the private sector. See, e.g.,
McCormack Baron & Associates, Statement of Qualifications and Experience (2002) (on file
with author).
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concept allows PHAs to combine their funding with other private and public
sources and to form partnerships with other entities for development,
ownership, and management purposes.82 This development concept is
intended to enhance the ability of PHAs to engage in meaningful collaboration
with other local organizations in working toward the revitalization of
The resulting financial
neighborhoods suffering from disinvestment.83
structure is quite complex,84 but many argue that it is this very complexity that
creates successful projects able to respond to the various interests of
neighborhood residents, real estate developers, and investors.85 Many view the
leveraging of HOPE VI funds with other public and private financing as the
best available response to the overwhelming need to revitalize the nation’s
public housing projects.86
D. Public Housing Residents
In keeping with its goal to “improve the living environment for public
housing residents of severely distressed public housing projects,”87 the HOPE
VI regulations mandate various provisions related to public housing residents
themselves. First, the regulations allow for up to 15% of a HOPE VI grant to
be used to fund economic and social support activities known as community
and supportive services (“CSS activities”).88 These services must be designed
to meet the needs of all residents of the severely distressed project, including
those remaining on-site, those permanently relocating, those temporarily
relocating, and new residents of the revitalized units.89 Appropriate CSS
activities include services such as educational activities, job readiness and
82. 24 C.F.R. § 941.600(a)(1) (2002).
83. 61 Fed. Reg. 19,708, 19,713 (May 2, 1996). HUD’s philosophy seems to be that such
opportunities will increase the likelihood of economic and racial integration. Id.
84. For example, Phase I of Murphy Park, a mixed income community funded under the
Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, the predecessor to HOPE VI, was financed through
both public and private resources, including a traditional first mortgage loan, public housing
development funds received under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992,
LIHTC equity investments from corporate investors, a loan secured by a first mortgage on a
ninety-nine year ground lease from the St. Louis Housing Authority to the developer, and loans
secured by second and third mortgages on the ground lease. The project also received support
from the City of St. Louis in the form of tax abatement, public improvements, and assistance in
securing corporate donations. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable
Housing and Neighborhood Development, 28 STETSON L. REV. 577, 589-90 (1999).
85. Id. at 593.
86. Greenbaum, supra note 35, at 311.
87. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,766 (Part I(A)(1)).
88. The HOPE VI program initially allowed for the use of up to 20% of the total grant to be
used to pay the cost of CSS activities. Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 stat. 1571 (1992). The
percentage allowance was eventually cut down to 15%. See July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at
49,778 (Part XI(2)).
89. Id. at 49,778-89 (Part XI(A)(8)).
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employment training, life skills training, credit unions, homeownership
counseling, substance abuse treatment, domestic violence education, and child
care services.90 Second, the regulations mandate at least some level of resident
involvement in creating the HOPE VI plan, though the precise extent of this
involvement is unclear.91 The following FHA analysis offers a more in-depth
view of the program’s ultimate impact on public housing residents.
V. ANALYSIS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Among its many mandates, Title VIII prohibits discrimination in housing
by making it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.”92 The FHA further mandates that HUD “administer the programs and
activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively
to further the policies of [fair housing].”93 In FHA cases, courts have generally
declined to take a narrow view of the phrase “because of race,” recognizing
that “a requirement that the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent before relief
can be granted under the statute is often a burden that is impossible to
satisfy.”94 Specifically, “a strict focus on intent permits racial discrimination
to go unpunished in the absence of evidence of overt bigotry.”95 Both Titles
VII (employment discrimination) and VIII (housing discrimination) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 have been interpreted to prohibit facially neutral
policies that have a disproportionate effect on individuals who are members of
a protected class, regardless of the defendant’s subjective intent.96 Perhaps
because of the similarities between the two statutes and the fact that both
statutes seek to address invidious discrimination, Title VIII doctrine has

90. Id. at 49,779-80 (Part XI(B)).
91. See Housing Reform Act of 1998, supra note 35, at sec. 535, § 24(e)(2)(D). For a full
discussion of this issue, see infra Part VI(A).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2000). The duty requires that HUD do more than simply refrain
from discriminating itself. NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d
149, 154 (1st Cir. 1987). This requires that HUD have a method whereby it collects the racial
and socioeconomic information necessary for compliance with its duties under the FHA.
Shannon v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3d Cir. 1970).
94. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977).
95. Id. at 1290.
96. Christopher P. McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an
Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 56364 (1986). The Court has used this disparate impact theory of liability in its articulation that a
facially neutral employment practice may violate Title VII without evidence of a subjective intent
to discriminate. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989).
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developed largely through analogy to existing Title VII doctrine.97 For
example, employment discrimination and housing discrimination disparate
impact claims are both analyzed using the same basic prima facie case
structure governing proof and persuasion: Upon plaintiff’s showing of a prima
facie case of disparate impact, the defendant is responsible for demonstrating a
sufficient justification for the policy.98 If the defendant is successful in
justifying the policy, the policy may nonetheless be held to be discriminatory if
the plaintiff is able to show that the defendant’s justification is merely
pretextual and that another, less discriminatory policy would serve the
defendant’s interests just as well.99 Because the Supreme Court has declined to
articulate the standards required to make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact under the FHA,100 the lower courts have been left to decide their own
standards and measures of what constitutes disparate impact.101 Though each
of the various lower courts follow the same basic burden-shifting model first
articulated in the Title VII cases, they have adopted different standards for the
prima facie showing required of plaintiffs and the extent of the justification
burden imposed on defendants.102 The standard imposed on a plaintiff ranges
from the relatively less stringent burden of demonstrating that the action
“actually or predictably results in discrimination”103 to the relatively more
stringent burden of prevailing under a factor test that takes more than mere
discriminatory effect into consideration. For example, the Seventh Circuit uses
the following factors to determine under what circumstances conduct that

97. See, e.g., Kristopher E. Ahrend, Effect, or No Effect: A Comparison of Prima Facie
Standards Applied in “Disparate Impact” Cases Brought Under the Fair Housing Act (Title
VIII), 2 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L. DIG. 64, 73 (1996); McCormack, supra note 96, at 564.
98. McCormack, supra note 96, at 564.
99. E.g., Hispanics United of DuPage Co. v. Vill. of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1162
(N.D. Ill. 1997).
100. In Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch NAACP, the Court expressed its
satisfaction that disparate impact had been shown and that the justification offered to rebut the
prima facie case was inadequate, but declined to reach the question of the proper disparate impact
test to be used in FHA analysis. 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988). It reserved the decision on the
appropriateness of the Title VIII test applied by the Second Circuit for a future case. Id. See also
Richard C. Cahn, Determining a Standard for Housing Discrimination under Title VIII, 7 TOURO
L. REV. 193, 193 (1990). The case that the Supreme Court has been waiting for may be City of
Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 263 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002). See discussion infra note 107.
101. The First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have all adopted an “effect-only” standard,
or a substantially similar standard. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have adopted a “fourfactors” standard. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted a “three-factors” standard. Ahrend,
supra note 97, at 71.
102. See generally Ahrend, supra note 97. Though many consider the differences between
these standards to be minimal, others argue that the differences are really quite significant. Id. at
65.
103. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974).
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produces a disparate impact will violate the FHA: (1) the strength of the
plaintiff’s demonstration of discriminatory effect; (2) whether there is some
evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant’s interest in taking the
action complained of, and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the
defendant to affirmatively provide housing for minorities or whether the
plaintiff simply wants to restrain the defendant from interfering with the
property owners who seek to provide such housing.104 The less stringent
model is known as the “effects test,” while the more stringent model is used in
“factors test” jurisdictions.105
Because guidance for the proper evidentiary showing of disparate impact
from the Supreme Court has yet to emerge, it is useful to consider the Court’s
Title VII cases. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,106 a Title VII employment discrimination case in which the court
specifically addressed the proper application of Title VII’s disparate impact
theory of liability, provides some guidance for proper FHA disparate impact
analysis.107 In Wards Cove, former salmon cannery workers alleged
employment discrimination on the basis of race.108 To prove their prima facie
case, the workers produced statistical evidence showing a high percentage of
nonwhite workers in the cannery jobs (unskilled positions on the cannery line)
and a low percentage of nonwhite workers in the noncannery positions (skilled
104. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. Of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977).
105. At least one commentator uses these terms to differentiate between the two major ways
courts evaluate FHA claims. See Ahrend, supra note 97, at 66-72 (introducing these terms and
analyzing cases that exemplify these approaches).
106. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
107. Importantly, it is far from clear that the Wards Cove analysis should be used to analyze
disparate impact claims under the FHA or whether the Title VII disparate impact theory of
liability should even be a recognized cause of action under the FHA. E.g., Brief for Petitioner at
*21-26, 2002 WL 31039413, City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 263 F.3d
627 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (No. 01-1269) (arguing that the
legislative and judicial history of the FHA do not support a disparate impact cause of action).
Many anticipated that the Supreme Court would take the opportunity to address the disparate
impact question when it decided City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation, 123 S. Ct. 1389 (2003), this Term. In Cuyahoga, a developer of low-income
housing brought equal protection, due process, and FHA claims. 123 S. Ct. at 1392. The FHA
claim was brought on the theory that repeal of an ordinance that had approved the development of
low income housing (and that led to the city’s decision to refuse to grant building permits) had a
disparate impact based on race. Cuyahoga, 263 F.3d at 640. The developer also argued that its
rights under the FHA were violated when the city gave effect to the anti-family biases of its
citizens by repealing the ordinance. Id. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could have
had important implications for disparate impact claims under the FHA. However, the developer
apparently abandoned the FHA claim and so the Court did not address the issue. Cuyahoga, 123
S. Ct. at 1397. A definitive answer on this question will have to wait until another appropriate
case comes before the Court.
108. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647-48.
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positions falling into a variety of classifications).109 The Supreme Court
rejected this type of analysis in favor of a comparison between the racial
composition of the at-issue jobs with the racial composition of the qualified
population in the relevant labor market.110 The Court explained that “if the
percentage of selected applicants who are nonwhite is not significantly less
than the percentage of qualified applicants who are nonwhite, the employer’s
selection mechanism probably does not operate with a disparate impact on
minorities.”111 In addition to setting forth the evidentiary standard required for
making out a prima facie disparate impact case, the Court further stated that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the particular employment practice that has
created the disparate impact.112 Further, despite the shifting persuasion burden
that controls disparate impact cases, the burden of proving that discrimination
has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff
throughout the litigation.113 To effectively evaluate the FHA claim that could
be brought in response to a HOPE VI plan, it is necessary to first consider the
prima facie case.
A.

The Prima Facie Case of Disparate Impact in a HOPE VI Case

A FHA claim made in response to the implementation of a HOPE VI
revitalization plan would likely be brought under the theory that the demolition
and replacement policy of the HOPE VI project denies and limits housing
opportunities because of race, sex, and/or familial status in violation of the
FHA.114 That is, the plaintiff would argue that the facially-neutral HOPE VI
revitalization plan results in a denial of housing opportunities to members of a
protected class, and that such denial has an adverse effect that is
disproportionate to the effect on those outside of the protected classes. Under
the FHA, when a decision “has a greater adverse impact on one racial group
than on another,” it is said to have a disparate impact.115 The court would need
to determine whether the redevelopment plan ultimately imposes a
comparatively greater harm on protected class members than it imposes on
those outside the protected classes. This determination would need to be made
on a case-by-case basis and would heavily depend on the specifics of the
proposed redevelopment plan. The court would likely consider the impact on
at least three groups as it determines whether implementation of a HOPE VI
revitalization plan creates a disparate impact: (1) the current residents; (2)
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
1977).

Id. at 650.
Id.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 657.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b) (2000).
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
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those on the public housing waiting list, and (3) those eligible for public
housing. If the plaintiff can prove that a policy or decision has deprived
protected class members of housing opportunities to a greater degree than it
has deprived unprotected individuals, a prima facie case will be made.
The difficulty that results from the Supreme Court’s refusal to endorse a
particular means of measuring disparate impact in FHA cases116 is that it is
unclear precisely how disparate impact should be measured. Though courts
tend to analogize to employment discrimination cases such as the Wards Cove
case set forth above, the analogy has been less than perfect, resulting in
complex methodologies and disputes among the various parties to the lawsuit
as to the correct measurement.117 Ultimately, courts have used a variety of
measurements of disparate impact, all of which generally focus on whether the
policy “‘bears more heavily on one race than another.’”118 No matter the
116. See Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988) (finding
that disparate impact was shown, but refusing to endorse the Second Circuit’s measurement of
disparate impact).
117. See, e.g., In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against the State of Ala., 198 F.3d
1305, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Demonstrating disparate impact in the first instance can be
tricky business; it often involves ominous-sounding methods of statistical inquiry . . .”);
Summerchase Ltd. P’ship I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522, 528-529 (M.D. La. 1997)
(determining whether the court should use “absolute numbers” or “proportional numbers” to
determine whether there was a disparate impact); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that the parties could not agree on the
methodology that should be used to determine whether there was a disparate impact);.
118. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(quoting Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). See also Edwards v. Johnston County
Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215, 1223 (4th Cir. 1989) (determining that plaintiffs’ disparate impact
claim failed because they did not prove that the policy affected minorities to any greater degree
than it affected whites); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a significant
disparate impact because two-thirds of those who would have benefited from the low-income
housing a developer wanted to build were minorities and the failure to build impacted protected
class members at twice the rate of unprotected individuals); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736
F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that the standard to be applied is “whether the policy in
question had a disproportionate impact on the minorities in the total group to which the policy
was applied”); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1288 (explaining that because a greater
number of minorities than whites satisfied the income requirements for subsidized housing, the
city’s refusal to permit the project had a greater impact on minorities than on whites pursuant to a
“statistical, effect-oriented view of causality”); Summerchase, 970 F. Supp. at 530 (examining the
composition of those households eligible to reside in the proposed low-income development and
determining that because approximately two-thirds of the eligible households were Caucasian and
one-third were African-American, there was no disparate impact because the decision not to issue
the permit affected Caucasians in a much greater proportion than African-Americans); Green v.
Sunpointe Assocs., No. C96-1542C, 1997 WL 1526484, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 1997)
(emphasizing that the proper measurement was to compare the presence of protected class
members in the group impacted by the facially-neutral policy with the presence of those class
members in the group of those eligible to participate in the given program or the general local
population, noting that comparison to those eligible for the program is the favored method, stating
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measure of disparate impact that is ultimately settled upon by the courts, it is
likely that a plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim in reaction to a HOPE
VI revitalization plan will be able to establish at least some level of disparate
impact. In general, minorities occupy a large percentage of the family public
housing stock. For example, in 1998, minorities occupied 69% of all public
housing.119 In particular, African-American households occupied nearly half
of all public housing units in 1998.120 Further, African-American households
tend to reside in public housing projects that are overwhelmingly populated by
other African-Americans.121 Also important to any FHA analysis is that single
women head 85% of public housing families with dependent children.122
Because protected class members overwhelmingly occupy public housing, it is
very likely that virtually any decision or policy related to the demolition and
revitalization of such housing will have a disparate impact on those protected
class members. Of course, because each case must be examined on its own
merits, this fact alone does not guarantee the plaintiff will be successful in
making out a prima facie case,123 but it does demonstrate that the more
determinative question in a HOPE VI FHA claim is whether there is sufficient
justification for the disparate impact created.

that the percentage of protected classes in the Section 8 program was considerably higher than the
percentage of protected classes in the surrounding population, and finding that, among current
residents, the policy impacted the protected class members at greater rates than it affected
unprotected classes).
119. HUD, A Picture of Subsidized Households, at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/assthsg/
statedata98/HUD4US3.TXT (last visited Jan. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Subsidized Households]. See
also Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in Public Housing, 9
GEO. J. ON POV. L. & POL’Y 35, 53 (2002) (citing a similar statistic for 1995).
120. Subsidized Households, supra note 119 (noting that 47% of public housing units are
occupied by African-Americans).
121. Hendrickson, supra note 119, at 53 (noting that, on average, African-American public
housing residents reside in public housing projects that are 85% African-American and only 8%
Caucasian).
122. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 47.
123. Whether a plaintiff can establish a showing of disparate impact to the degree necessary
to establish a prima facie case may not be an easy task. It remains unclear just how severe the
discriminatory effect must be in order to constitute a violation of the FHA. Even if the plaintiff is
able to state a viable claim, he or she still has a substantial burden to prove the alleged violations
of the FHA. See J. Mark Powell, Fair Housing in the United States: A Legal Response to
Municipal Intransigence, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 279, 288 (1997). For example, in Darst-Webbe,
the court apparently did not think plaintiffs had proven any allegations of discrimination based on
race, sex, or familial status. The court relegated its opinion on the matter to a single footnote at
the end of the opinion, stating that it “found absolutely no evidence of discrimination.” DarstWebbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. Saint Louis Hous. Auth., 202 F. Supp. 2d 938, 950 n.17 (E.D. Mo.
2001). It seems clear that both the prima facie case of whether a significant discriminatory
impact can be shown and the rebuttal opportunity for a defendant to prove a legitimate
government purpose are highly dependent on the particular facts of any given case.
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The Justifying Government Purpose in a HOPE VI Case

Perhaps the more determinative question in a FHA analysis is whether,
given a finding of disparate impact, the defendant can sufficiently justify its
actions in order to avoid FHA liability. Analogizing again to the Wards Cove
analysis, once the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of disparate
impact the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a justification for the
practice.124 The Wards Cove Court explained that this phase of the analysis
consists of two components. First, the fact finder must consider any
justifications that an employer offers for the use of the practice in question.
Second, the fact finder should consider the availability of alternative practices
that would bring about the same business goals with less racial impact.125
Burdens of the proposed alternatives, such as cost, are relevant in determining
whether alternative practices would be equally as effective as the challenged
practice.126 In transferring this doctrine to FHA cases, courts’ precise rebuttal
burdens have varied to some degree, largely depending on the particular
court’s requirements for a prima facie case. In an “effects test” circuit, the
standard that attaches to the justification burden ranges from a “legitimate and
bona fide”127 to a “compelling”128 government interest. In a “factors test”
jurisdiction, the justification concept is embedded within the factor analysis.129

124. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 (1989). The Wards Cove
disparate impact standards for employment discrimination cases were codified in part and
overruled in part by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000). The codification retains a form of the
justification defense originally provided in Wards Cove. Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207
F.3d 43, 50 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999).
125. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658.
126. Id. at 661.
127. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977).
128. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974). At
least one commentator suggests that the Black Jack “compelling interest” standard really is not
very different from the “legitimate and bona fide” standard articulated by other courts.
McCormack, supra note 96, at 603. McCormack noted that the “necessary to a compelling
interest” standard is tempered by other factors, including whether the choice made in fact does
further the governmental interest asserted, whether the interest served by the choice is
constitutionally permissible and substantial enough to outweigh the private detriment, and
whether less drastic means are available. Id. at 603 n.289.
129. Although the burden-shifting concept underlies a proper discriminatory effect analysis in
both “effects test” and “factors test” circuits, its use is less detectable in “factors test”
jurisdictions. It has been somewhat unclear whether the factors test merely sets the requirements
for a prima facie case with a separate justification phase to follow, or whether the factors
constitute a final determination on the merits. Hispanics United of DuPage v. Vill. of Addison,
988 F. Supp. 1130, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1997). It generally has been determined that the factors
constitute a guide for a court’s ultimate determination and should be used to “navigate to a
conclusion on the merits.” Id. at 1153. It would be redundant to engage in a justification phase
after a consideration of the factors because one of the factors already considers the defendant’s
interest in taking the action. Id. at 1153 n.14. In both types of jurisdictions, the defendant must
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Ultimately, the various tests all seek to balance the defendant’s interests in
enacting the plan with the disparate impact it creates.130 Most disparate impact
cases also encompass the concept that a justification made in response to a
disparate impact claim will be sufficient to avoid FHA liability only if no less
discriminatory alternatives exist. The plaintiff would most likely proffer
suggestions of less discriminatory alternatives,131 with the defendant having
the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered alternatives would not
effectuate its purpose.132 This concept embraces the idea that the parties
should determine whether alternative approaches might reduce the raciallydiscriminatory effect.133 If a less discriminatory alternative would also serve
the legitimate interests of the entity implementing the policy, the defendant’s
choice would be viewed “merely as a ‘pretext’ for discrimination.”134
As the First Circuit pointed out in Langlois v. Abington Housing
Authority,135 “practically all” of the cases examined by the courts dealing with
employment and housing discrimination treat a showing of discriminatory
impact as “doing no more than creating a prima facie case, forcing the
defendant to proffer a valid justification.”136 Further, both private and
government actions produce disparate racial effects quite frequently; such
impact is “merely the basis for requiring justification.”137 For example, in
Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority, the court concluded that the
defendant PHAs’ choice to maintain local residency preferences in ranking
applicants for Section 8 rent subsidy vouchers did not violate the FHA, despite

offer justification for its actions; in the “effects test” jurisdictions, this justification phase occurs
after a disparate impact has been shown, and, in the “factors test” jurisdictions, the justification is
considered as part of the court’s factor analysis.
130. McCormack, supra note 96, at 602. McCormack argues that the concept of Title VII
business necessity helps to effect Title VIII’s purpose because it suggests that a defendant should
be required to explain its actions and should face liability if its explanation is inadequate. Id. at
604.
131. See, e.g., Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 56
F.3d 1243, 1254 (10th Cir. 1995); Hispanics United, 988 F. Supp. at 1162 (noting that the
plaintiff may satisfy its burden of persuasion by demonstrating that less discriminatory
alternatives are available).
132. See, e.g., Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d
Cir. 1988) (stating that a disparate impact claim could be overcome by demonstrating that the
actions furthered, “in theory and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that
no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect”), aff’d by 488 U.S. 15
(1988); Hispanics United, 988 F. Supp. at 1163 (determining that there was little likelihood that
less discriminatory alternatives could have furthered the city’s interests).
133. McCormack, supra note 96, at 605.
134. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) (quoting Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
135. Id. at 43.
136. Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 50.
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the fact that such a choice did create a disparate impact.138 In this “effects test”
jurisdiction, the court found that the PHAs demonstrated a legitimate reason
for the discriminatory effect, thereby justifying the policy’s negative impact.
This justification focused on the fact that PHAs are local agencies seeking to
assist local residents and that Congress itself endorsed the use of local
preferences in the distribution of Section 8 vouchers.139 A similar rationale
was relied upon in Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Village of
Addison,140 a case concerning final approval of a proposed consent decree to
dispose of FHA claims made by a group of Hispanic residents.141 When the
city began purchasing and demolishing multifamily residences in largely
Hispanic neighborhoods, which it claimed were blighted, those affected by the
decision sued the city under the theory that the prior and planned acquisition
and demolition had a disparate impact on Hispanic residents.142 In considering
the fairness of the consent decree, the court found that it would have been
possible for the city to sustain its burden of proving legitimate justifications for
engaging in the acquisition and demolition of the multifamily residences.143
The city’s justifications focused on the fact that the residences had recurring
housing code violations, poor property maintenance, and that high-density
development had overshadowed necessary greenspace.144 In this “factors test”
jurisdiction, the factor inquiring into the defendant’s intent probably would
favor defendants who likely would be able to produce legitimate
justifications.145
In considering the implication of these cases within the HOPE VI context,
the determinative issue would be the defendant’s ability to proffer a sufficient
justification for the discriminatory effect created by the implementation of a
revitalization plan. Careful examination of the HOPE VI program reveals the
following possible justifications that could prove sufficient to pass FHA
scrutiny: (1) the program’s goal of bringing about more integrated living
patterns by lessening the concentration of very low income households; (2)
using federal resources as tools for reinvesting in urban neighborhoods; (3) the
program’s focus on improving living environments and increasing the selfsufficiency of public housing residents by addressing their physical, social, and
economic needs, and (4) granting local PHAs with the flexibility necessary to
more efficiently provide for local housing needs. Though there are an
indefinite number of possible justifications for the disparate impact created by
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 51.
Id.
988 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1162.
Hispanics United, 988 F. Supp. at 1163.
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the implementation of a HOPE VI plan, the following four justifications
provide a representative sample of the types of justifications defendants might
offer. When HOPE VI projects are used to further legitimate goals, the
projects are much more likely to pass FHA scrutiny because the discriminatory
impact will be justified. These justifications are discussed in greater detail
below.
1.

Integrated Living Patterns

As previously explained, U.S. housing policy has generally resulted in
concentrations of very low income families in often segregated areas.146 One
recommendation the Commission made was to allow for a greater mix of
The
incomes in severely distressed public housing developments.147
Commission believed that including working families in public housing
developments could provide a stabilizing force in distressed developments and
would help to eliminate the possibility that such developments would be
further isolated.148 The Commission emphasized that this was necessary to
improve management and livability within public housing developments.149
The Commission also noted that such a policy would allow PHAs to “take
steps to promote stable communities in severely distressed public housing and
to promote the idea that this housing is a valuable community resource.”150
This recommendation forms the basis of the HOPE VI emphasis on decreasing
the concentration of very low income families in specific neighborhoods.151
Importantly, this policy comports with the FHA goal to establish “a policy of
dispersal through open housing . . . look[ing] to the eventual dissolution of the
ghetto and the construction of low and moderate income housing in the
suburbs . . . .”152 Further, the Supreme Court has identified the goal of Title
VIII as “replace[ment of] ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living
patterns.’”153 Housing opportunities created through the HOPE VI program
can decrease the current concentrations of very low income citizens in the
urban core, thereby effectuating this policy goal and providing positive
benefits for families.154

146. Hendrickson, supra note 119, at 53.
147. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 69.
148. Id. at 104.
149. Id. at 70.
150. Id.
151. Housing Reform Act of 1998, supra note 35, at § 535 (a), 112 Stat. 2518, 2581.
152. 114 CONG. REC. 2,985 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
153. 114 CONG. REC. 3,422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). See also Linmark Assocs. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977) (emphasizing that Title VIII represents “a
strong national commitment to promote integrated housing.”).
154. Many argue that the de-concentration strategy employed by HOPE VI is not aimed to
assist the residents who are being displaced, but “a more ambiguously defined community of
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Urban Revitalization

In addition to the integrated living pattern justification, proponents of a
HOPE VI plan can point to the need for neighborhood reinvestment. Efforts to
bring about more integrated living patterns cannot be relegated merely to
public housing developments. Instead the policy focus must incorporate entire
neighborhoods. The government’s fair housing policy is ultimately concerned
with making “full and free housing choice a reality.”155 Truly effectuating this
policy requires reinvestment in minority neighborhoods so that these
neighborhoods “are no longer deprived of essential public and private
resources.”156 When this occurs, the opportunity for stable, racially-mixed
neighborhoods emerges as a meaningful choice.157
Public housing
developments do not exist in isolation; rather, their successes and failures are
closely connected to the surrounding neighborhood. The need for reinvestment
in urban neighborhoods is addressed within the HOPE VI context as funds are
leveraged by PHAs collaborating with other local institutions to effect
revitalization of the neighborhoods where the severely distressed public
housing is located.158
3.

Self-Sufficiency

In addition to advancing policies that bring about more integrated living
patterns and provide for reinvestment in urban neighborhoods, the government
also has a legitimate interest in providing incentives for economic selfsufficiency. Public housing historically has been criticized because it tends to
foster disincentives for economic self-sufficiency.159 The physical location of
the inner-city can limit opportunities to escape poverty because many jobs are

stakeholders, those whose revulsion at the deterioration they see or imagine may have prompted
them to ‘disinvest’ in the neighborhood.” Bennett, supra note 73, at 280.
155. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,782.
156. Id.
157. Id. HUD intends that two goals be advanced through the use of HOPE VI revitalization
grants: (1) the expansion of assisted housing opportunities in non-minority neighborhoods, and
(2) reinvestment in minority neighborhoods to improve the quality of affordable housing there.
Id. It must be recognized that the latter goal is much more politically difficult than the former.
See, e.g., Note, Making Mixed-Income Communities Possible: Tax Base Sharing and Class
Desegregation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1575 (2001) (noting that a wealthy locality rationally
will seek to prevent construction of low-income housing). However, merely because the
implementation of a policy is politically difficult does not mean that it is not a valid policy goal.
The reality that it will be relatively easy for local PHAs to reinvest in minority neighborhoods
without complementary efforts to expand assisted housing opportunities in non-minority
neighborhoods is a reality that should be carefully scrutinized. A local PHA that wants to present
this concept as evidence of justification for disparate impact must be held accountable for its
efforts to effectuate both policies, not just the politically less difficult one.
158. See 24 C.F.R. § 941.600(a)(1) (2002); 61 Fed. Reg. 19,708 (May 2, 1996).
159. Housing Reform Act of 1998, supra note 35, § 502(a)(3).
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located outside the neighborhoods where inner-city residents live.160 The
Commission summarized this problem by noting that disincentives for
economic self-sufficiency included the fact that rent calculation regulations
gave little incentive for a public housing resident to maintain employment
because of substantial rent increases for every dollar earned.161 HOPE VI
provides a means of responding to this need to increase opportunities for
economic self-sufficiency by implementing policies that reward employment
and economic self-sufficiency among public housing residents.162 The
program’s explicit purpose is to create incentives and economic opportunities
for public housing residents to “work, become self-sufficient, and transition
out of public housing and federally assisted dwelling units.”163 Poverty
generates social and economic problems that impose enormous costs on the
residents themselves and also on the entire nation.164
4.

PHA Efficiency

Finally, the federal government’s choice to grant local PHAs more
flexibility can provide another source of justification for the disparate impact
imposed by a HOPE VI revitalization plan. Importantly, Congress has decided
that the past federal policy of overseeing every aspect of public housing has
worsened the problems associated with public housing and has placed great
administrative burdens on local PHAs.165 Large administrative costs and
bureaucratic delays tend to consume scarce resources that can be better used
elsewhere (e.g. building more affordable housing, funding support services, or
paying higher salaries to attract higher quality program administrators).
Further, such large bureaucracies tend to be less responsive to local problems
and often fail to consider the unique strengths and weaknesses of each

160. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
795, 799-800 (1991). Schill suggested that concentration effects “may feed upon themselves”
because as communities become increasingly populated by residents who turn to deviant or
illegal behaviors due to their inability to find a job, businesses will likely choose to relocate to a
location with access to a more appropriate labor pool. Id. at 805 (discussing the theories of
William J. Wilson). In his article, Schill summarized the two major strategies to alleviate the
problem of concentrated ghetto poverty: (1) bring jobs closer to people by promoting economic
development within the inner-city, and (2) bring people closer to jobs by dispersing inner-city
populations or facilitating access through improved transportation networks. Id. at 808.
161. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 103.
162. Housing Reform Act of 1998, supra note 35, § 502(a)(5)(D).
163. Id. at § 502(b)(5), 112 Stat. 2521 (1998).
164. Schill, supra note 160, at 815-16. Schill noted that this can lead to “[a] generation of
urban poor becom[ing] recipients of public assistance rather than productive members of the
workforce.” Id. at 816.
165. Housing Reform Act of 1998, supra note 35, § 502(a)(4).
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individual PHA.166
Arguably, a federal policy that emphasizes the
consolidation and streamlining of various public housing programs will better
serve the public interest than a policy that emphasizes strict federal control.167
Ultimately, allowing for more local control and flexible use of federal funds
can contribute to increasing the amount of viable affordable housing, perhaps
to an extent that justifies the disparate impact created by a HOPE VI
revitalization plan.168
These justifications all essentially embody the concept that the government
has a legitimate interest in promoting the production of affordable housing.169
The government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that housing policies are
carried out in a manner that will create positive benefits and make the most
efficient use of scarce resources. The decision to take housing policy in a new
direction is arguably a justified and necessary policy choice. Many agree that
the public housing policies of past decades have failed and that a new course of
action is necessary.170 In considering the FHA’s impact on the HOPE VI
program, it is essential to recognize that there exist numerous justifications for
the disparate impact the revitalization plans often create. It is equally
important to recognize that those harmed by a revitalization plan have the
opportunity to demonstrate that these justifications are merely pretextual and
that other, less discriminatory means exist for accomplishing the same goals.
Unless the proffered justifications prove to be merely pretextual, however, it is
likely that a HOPE VI plan would pass FHA scrutiny because the disparate
impact it creates could be justified by a legitimate government purpose.

166. The Commission found that “HUD micromanages PHAs to the extent that there is little
flexibility in the public housing program.” FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 22. This impedes a
PHA’s ability to respond to the needs of its housing developments. The Commission argued that
PHAs need authority to make decisions and to allocate funds in ways that will best meet the
needs of their developments. Id.
167. Housing Reform Act of 1998, supra note 35, § 502(a)(5)(A) & (B).
168. See id. § 502 (b)(1), (2).
169. The need for governmental support for affordable housing is not a need that is likely to
decrease in the foreseeable future. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American:
Can the 1949 Goal be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1639 (1993). Salsich argued that “[t]he
failure to recognize the reality of long-term housing needs has been a major contributor to the
impatient attitude with which most Americans view governmental housing programs.” Id. at
1640.
170. Public housing is generally considered to be a failure by most Americans, but remains an
important rental housing resource for many low-income families. See id. at 1641. Salsich noted
that “[a] repeated flaw of federal housing programs has been the insistence that affordable
housing units be physically occupied by low-income persons. What is needed instead is a
constant inventory of affordable housing units in a setting that encourages diversity in housing
and provides role models for others.” Id.
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C. The Showing of Mere Pretext in a HOPE VI Case
As previously explained, the final step in a typical housing or employment
discrimination analysis is to give the plaintiff the opportunity to demonstrate
that there are less discriminatory ways to carry out the goals of the defendant,
thereby demonstrating that the defendant’s proffered justifications are merely
pretextual. In the HOPE VI context, plaintiffs might bring forth a variety of
less discriminatory alternatives.
Further, these plaintiffs might also
demonstrate that a given justification is hallow and merely serves to hide other,
illegitimate PHA goals that are not proper justifications for the disparate
impact that the plan creates. Arguments in favor of less discriminatory
alternatives will generally focus on analyses that conclude: (1) more hard units
of public housing should be included in the plan,171 and (2) the size and cost of
the new units should be tailored to reflect the local affordable housing need
(i.e. the disparate impact should be minimized by ensuring that at least the
current residents who wish to return to the revitalized site are “eligible” for the
new units).172 Attempts to demonstrate that a given justification is merely a
shell to hide other, impermissible goals also might focus on illegitimate
motives such as a local PHA’s submission to political pressures to free up
prime real estate for market rate development.
1.

Alternative Plans

Arguments for a less discriminatory alternative that focuses on increasing
the number of public housing units in a given plan essentially advocate
changing the ratio of public housing to nonpublic housing units. Because
HOPE VI projects, unlike other public housing developments, are uniquely
sensitive to market forces, there must be a careful balance between the mix of
public housing and market rate units. Therefore, without clear evidence that
the site could easily support more public housing units, an argument to
increase the number of public housing units is likely to fail. However, an
argument that advocates tailoring the plan to reflect the size and cost
requirements of those in need of affordable housing is likely to have a better
chance of succeeding. HOPE VI provides that “persons displaced by the
reconstruction activities provided for [in the HOPE VI appropriations statute]

171. This ostensibly would lessen the disparate impact because a greater number of units
means that fewer protected class members would be denied the opportunity for affordable
housing.
172. This ostensibly would lessen the disparate impact because more affordable units that are
large enough to accommodate larger families would reduce the number of protected class
members adversely affected by the decision to revitalize. This concept overlaps with other claims
plaintiffs might bring in response to a HOPE VI revitalization plan, namely that defendants had
not complied with HOPE VI requirements.
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shall be eligible for . . . replacement units.”173 The meaning of “eligible” is a
source of potential dispute, but the requirement does provide a basis for
plaintiffs to argue that the units should be tailored to current residents.174 Less
discriminatory alternatives that are based on one or both of these concepts are
likely to lessen the discriminatory impact of a revitalization plan, and in some
cases, will be an alternative sufficient to overcome the justifications proffered
in support of the HOPE VI project. However, such proposals might prove
insufficient if they do not effectuate the defendant’s purposes at least as well as
the disputed plan. It is essential to recognize that, in order to overcome the
defendant’s legitimate justification for the policy or decision, the plaintiff must
show that a less discriminatory alternative would comparably serve the
legitimate interests of the entity implementing the policy.175 The defendant’s
interest in successful revitalization will be thwarted if its goals of a mixedincome, revitalized community are ignored by the proffered less discriminatory
alternatives.
2.

Illegitimate Purpose

In addition to offering viable less discriminatory alternatives, the plaintiff
might also discount a proffered justification by demonstrating that it hides an
illegitimate purpose. Revitalization activity that is motivated by illegitimate
goals is not in keeping with the spirit of the HOPE VI program and therefore

173. Departments of Veteran Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571, 1580 (1992).
174. Plaintiffs would likely argue that the term encompasses two ideas: (1) units for which
they meet any formal qualifications, and (2) units which are of the size (e.g. larger number of
bedrooms) and price they require. See Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 51-52, DarstWebbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. Saint Louis Housing Auth. No. 02-1777/1778 EMSL (8th Cir. 2002)
(on file with author). Defendants are likely to maintain that the term refers only to formal
qualifications and not to size or cost requirements. On the issue of whether HOPE VI requires
that people who are displaced because of reconstruction activities shall be eligible for
replacement units of their choice to the “maximum extent practicable,” the Cabrini-Green court
found that the statutory language was too vague to be enforceable. Cabrini-Green Local Advisory
Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 96 C 6949, 1997 WL 31002, at *16 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 22, 1997)
(discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1437l & 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(2)). A related concern is that tenants from
the original neighborhood who want to move back in will be unable to do so because they cannot
meet the formal screening requirements, let alone find units of the appropriate size and cost. Poor
credit history or minor criminal histories might lead to denial. John J. Ammann, Housing out the
Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 320 (2000). HOPE VI grantees are required to develop
Management Agreements that address: (1) incentives that reward work and promote family
stability; (2) a system of local preferences adopted in response to local housing needs; (3) lease
requirements that encourage self-sufficiency; (4) site-based waiting lists; (5) strict applicant
screening requirements; (6) strict enforcement of lease and eviction provisions; and (7) improving
the safety and security of residents and eliminating crime and drugs from the neighborhood. July
2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,772.
175. Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989).
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should not overcome a prima facie showing of disparate impact because no
legitimate justification exists for the harm imposed. Perhaps the most
prevalent example of such an illegitimate goal is the degree to which a HOPE
VI project is undertaken amidst local political pressures to free up prime real
estate for market rate development. As the Commission itself stated, 94% of
public housing does not meet the HOPE VI severely distressed threshold
requirement and is therefore not appropriate for the program.176 However,
many maintain that the program has been broadly applied to fund the
demolition of units that are not truly distressed.177 For example, in areas where
gentrification has begun and a public housing site remains as the last “island of
affordability,” there can be considerable pressure to use HOPE VI grant money
to reduce the number of affordable units in the area while freeing up real estate
for market-rate units.178 HOPE VI proposals to demolish obsolete units carry
the risk that they will contribute to the affordable-housing crisis when local
developers and politicians seek to free the property for more profitable uses.179
Further, there is a risk that when “[t]aking the long view,” HOPE VI has the
potential to “echo . . . the urban renewal of years past” when entire
communities were destroyed in the name of urban renewal.180 A project that is
primarily motivated by such desire is an illegitimate use of the HOPE VI
program.181
Beneath the surface of these arguments lies the idea that the resources
devoted to a given HOPE VI project would be better used by simply
maintaining the public housing stock already in existence. Most agree that the
housing resources currently in existence should not be taken for granted.182 It

176. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 199.
177. See, e.g., Public Housing Overhaul, supra note 35 (charging that the HOPE VI program
has been broadly applied and that demolished units could be refurbished for the same cost but for
local political pressures to free up prime real estate).
178. See, e.g., Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification:
Lessons Learned from the D.C. Housing Authority’s HOPE VI Projects, 10 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 353, 357 (2001) (relating that “[f]ar from leading the neighborhood of
Capitol Hill toward revitalization, the project barely succeeded in rebuilding a few affordable
units in the immediate area” and that “[f]rom the perspective of the approximately 20,000 lowincome households on the waiting list for DCHA housing or Section 8 vouchers, it looks like
another tool in the hands of the area’s gentrifiers to reduce the number of affordable units.”).
179. Id. at 359.
180. Bennett, supra note 73, at 263.
181. Of course, from an evidentiary standpoint, this motive may be hard to decipher. Such
motivation would perhaps be evidenced by communications among community decision-makers
and the extent to which the plan contains the maximum proportion of public housing units
appropriate for the particular housing market.
182. Bennett, supra note 73, at 264-65 (noting that “in a housing economy in which many
who earn minimum wage would have to work between 103 and 133 hours a week to earn the
amount necessary to make rent on a two bedroom apartment, and full time teachers, police
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is understandable that residents of public housing would choose to fight to
keep imperfect housing rather than take the risk that they will end up worse off
than before.183 However, it is essential to recognize that the housing policies
embodied within the HOPE VI program do not necessarily result in fewer
opportunities for low-income families. Creative use of the more flexible
HOPE VI program can result in a variety of affordable housing options.184 If
HOPE VI is to represent a viable housing policy that comports with the FHA,
Congress will need to consider modifications to the current requirements to
help ensure that the disparate impact on protected classes is less significant and
that the government’s purpose in effectuating the plan is a legitimate one.
VI. MODIFICATIONS NEEDED IN THE CURRENT HOPE VI PROGRAM
Modifications such as those outlined below can improve the effectiveness
of the HOPE VI program and will help to ensure its policies comply with FHA
goals. These modifications can be useful tools for strengthening the program
and ensuring its future success so that it can continue as a viable means of
addressing the nation’s affordable housing crisis. Of course, virtually any
given redevelopment project is likely to displace a certain number of FHAprotected class members. Therefore, it is important to recognize that anything
short of a discontinuance of the HOPE VI grant program cannot completely
eliminate the risk of violating the FHA. Despite these concerns, HOPE VI
represents one of the best options for addressing the immediate problems
associated with severely distressed public housing. Modifications to the
current program that begin to address problems of resident displacement and
the dwindling supply of traditional public housing units are necessary if the
HOPE VI program and the FHA are to legitimately coexist. Importantly,
HOPE VI must be viewed as one of many tools available to address the
affordable housing crisis on local, regional, and national levels. Modifications
to the current program will have little effect unless other housing tools, such as
the Section 8 program and the LIHTC program, are also strengthened and
creatively used in conjunction with HOPE VI.
The House of Representatives’ recent attempt to amend the criteria used to
evaluate HOPE VI grant applications provides a useful framework for
evaluating changes that would likely improve the HOPE VI program. In

officers, and laborers seek emergency overnight shelter, no housing resource can be taken for
granted”).
183. Id. at 301-302 (“Sometimes, residents have rejected the rhetoric of a better tomorrow and
fought to keep what they know of an imperfect today. In other instances, residents have litigated
and negotiated to preserve as much as possible of an opportunity to return in strength, re-knit as a
community.”).
184. Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, HOPE VI: A Vital Tool for Comprehensive
Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 527, 531-32 (2001).
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November 2002, the House passed a bill (“the House bill”)185 that mandated
that some additional criteria be used to evaluate HOPE VI applicant plans.186
Though the House bill was not considered by the Senate this term,187 the fact
that it was passed by the House indicates that this issue will likely be revisited
in the future. The additional criteria contained in the House bill include: (1)
the applicant’s ability to begin and complete the revitalization expeditiously;
(2) the applicant’s ability to minimize temporary or permanent displacement of
current residents; (3) the extent to which the number of units affordable to
public housing residents are maintained or created, and (4) whether existing
residents are given priority to occupy the units in the revitalized community.188
Although these additional criteria are a good starting point for addressing
HOPE VI’s impact on current public housing residents and its impact on the
nation’s overall supply of affordable housing units, other criteria, such as one
that addresses CSS activities, should also be considered in future debates.
A.

Public Housing Residents

As the House bill makes clear, HOPE VI plans should be evaluated on
their ability to minimize disruption to the lives of public housing residents and
the larger community in which they live. Efforts to minimize temporary and
permanent displacement, as well as efforts to give current residents priority in
returning to the revitalized site should be an essential part of any HOPE VI
revitalization effort. These concerns ultimately lead to more fundamental
questions about the appropriate level of resident participation.189 Meaningful
resident and community participation can help ensure that displacement is kept
185. HOPE VI Program Reauthorization Act of 2002, H.R. 5499, 107th Cong. (2002).
186. In addition to this bill, Congress previously has expressed its concern regarding the
effects of HOPE VI policies on public housing residents. For example, it mandated that the longterm effects of HOPE VI policies be studied. See Pub. L. No. 106-74, 113 Stat. 1058 (1999)
(mandating that $1,200,000 of the $575,000,000 appropriation be used by the Urban Institute “to
conduct an independent study on the long-term effects of the HOPE VI program on former
residents of distressed public housing developments”).
187. Congress Adjourns, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COALITION, Nov. 22, 2002, at
http://www.nlihc.org/mtm/mtm7-46.htm.
188. HOPE VI Program Reauthorization Act of 2002, H.R. 5499, 107th Cong. (2002).
189. Resident involvement is a particularly difficult issue because it is unclear what level of
involvement residents should have. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 208-209 (revealing that some
of the important questions are: “Does ‘meaningful involvement’ mean that HUD wants more than
resident comments? Should the residents be involved in decision making? If so, to what extent?
How much control over the planning and implementation should the residents be given? What
happens if the PHA and/or HUD do not agree with what the residents want?”); Bennett, supra
note 73, at 304 (arguing that HUD’s guidance sends mixed messages about the essentialness of
resident participation). The Commission envisioned that “[p]ublic housing residents [would] be
afforded maximum feasible and meaningful participation in planning, designing, and
implementing the programs recommended by the Commission to address the conditions of severe
distress.” FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.
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minimal and that priorities for future occupation at the revitalized site will
comport with the needs and goals of public housing residents and the larger
community in which they reside. Further, meaningful resident participation is
likely to bring about more cooperation because those affected by the decision
will have a greater opportunity to make valuable contributions to the
revitalization process. Program administrators must recognize that an
insincere or token request for input will most likely be followed by resistance
and resentment. When a plan is imposed upon residents, they legitimately feel
the need to protect their interests by organizing against the implementation of
the plan.
Although HUD currently requires that residents be fully and meaningfully
involved in revitalization efforts,190 the significant amount of resistance to
some HOPE VI plans indicates that at least some public housing residents do
not feel that they are enjoying the benefit of this mandate. Currently, in order
to qualify for funding, the grant recipient must comply with minimal standards
in regard to resident involvement. These standards include one resident
training session on the HOPE VI development process and three public
meetings with residents and the broader community.191 An applicant may
secure a higher ranking if it meets certain criteria in addition to these minimal
threshold requirements.
These additional criteria include regular and
significant communication with affected residents and community members,
regular efforts to make appropriate HUD communications about HOPE VI
available, and reasonable training on the general principles of development so
that residents may meaningfully participate.192 Though this current structure
provides a good starting point for encouraging significant resident
involvement, it does little to ensure the reality of resident participation. Unless
this issue is more fully addressed, the current minimal standards governing
resident involvement are likely to fail. From the residents’ standpoint, minimal
training and meeting requirements seem to indicate HUD’s disinterest in
hearing the residents’ views and perhaps also tends to reflect an inclination to
impose a plan upon the residents instead of going through the considerably
less-efficient process of listening to those whose lives will be directly impacted
by the decision. Often, the local PHA, the developer, the larger community,
and the public housing residents themselves may have conflicting interests in
190. The mandate for full and meaningful resident involvement can be found in various
documents. See, e.g., July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,778.
191. HUD does not dictate the content of the training session. The three public meetings are
intended to cover the planning and implementation process, the proposed physical plan, the extent
of proposed demolition, planned community and support service activities, other proposed
revitalization activities, relocation issues, re-occupancy plans and policies, and employment
opportunities to be created as a result of the redevelopment. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at
49,778.
192. Id. at 49,778.
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regard to the HOPE VI project. Ignoring this reality only invites future
conflicts that are likely to result in litigation.193 On the other hand, when steps
are taken to ensure participation in the process, the revitalization process is
likely to be much more smooth.194
In order to increase the level of meaningful resident participation and
minimize the negative effects of displacement, HOPE VI administrators should
evaluate HOPE VI plans on a given PHA’s (or its developer’s) ability to create
strong relationships with neighborhood groups to learn about their goals,
needs, and expectations with respect to the revitalization of their
community.195 In addition to creating such relationships, the applicants should
be encouraged or required to use a neutral third party to help facilitate
discussions among various stakeholders as they articulate their desires for the
revitalization process. Toward this end, applicants should further be required
to demonstrate how they will involve community members in all stages of the
revitalization process. Finally, displacement effects should be minimized by
strictly enforcing the provisions of an applicant’s required Relocation Plan,
which “is intended to ensure that . . . all residents who have been or will be
temporarily or permanently relocated from the site are provided with . . . CSS
activities such as mobility counseling and direct assistance in locating
housing.”196 Although the current scoring structure awards points for a plan to
track residents who have been relocated or a plan to provide mobility
counseling and direct assistance in locating housing for Section 8 recipients in
non-poverty areas,197 such a provision should be a threshold requirement rather
than merely a means to obtain additional application points. Strengthening the
focus on current residents is likely to increase the number of stakeholders who

193. See, e.g., Ammann, supra note 174, at 320; Kristen D.A. Carpenter, Promise
Enforcement in Public Housing: Lessons from Rousseau and Hundertwasser, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1073, 1131-32 (“There are tremendous consequences in failing to secure resident support for the
new development . . . . Residents must be included in decision-making processes, and they need
to be expected to act as stewards.”).
194. For example, at the start of the Murphy Park revitalization process in St. Louis,
Missouri, a nonprofit organization was created to act as a conduit for neighborhood participation.
A residential leadership team was created to identify year resident needs and to create a strategic
community plan, thereby developing resources and enlisting stakeholder support for the plan. See
Deborah L. Myerson, Sustaining Urban Mixed-Income Communities: The Role of Community
Facilities, ULI LAND USE POLICY FORUM REP., Oct, 2001, at 3.
195. In its Statement of Qualifications and Experience, McCormack Baron & Associates
stated that its “[d]evelopments frequently involve partnerships with community groups, local
government, and foundations. In nearly all instances, conventional development techniques are
inappropriate for urban neighborhoods, and a joint venture with a nonprofit organization or
community development corporation creates a quality development that contributes to both
neighborhood stability and city growth.” McCormack Baron & Associates, supra note 81.
196. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,780.
197. Id.
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feel that they are a meaningful part of the revitalization process and decrease
the number of those who feel the necessity to file a lawsuit in order to assert
their rights.
B.

Number, Size, and Type of Affordable Units

In addition to evaluating applicants on their ability to meaningfully involve
residents and community members, HOPE VI administrators should encourage
applicants to create plans that address the need for more affordable units that
are of the appropriate size and type to accommodate public housing families.
Creative development that incorporates an appropriate number of affordable
units that are of the appropriate size and type to accommodate public housing
families will help eliminate some degree of disproportionate impact. In
addressing the need to create and maintain a high number of affordable units,
administrators should focus on creating incentives to: (1) increase the public
housing to market rate ratio within the development; (2) rehabilitate and
redesign instead of using wholesale demolition techniques, and (3) build offsite replacement units. Further, in addressing the need for units that are of the
appropriate size and type, administrators should focus on incentives to create
larger units and should explore expanded concepts of what might qualify as a
homeownership unit.
Currently, a PHA receives three points if its application describes a unit
mix of more than 35% public housing units; it receives two points for a unit
mix of 25–34% public housing units; it receives one point for a unit mix of 15–
24%; and, the PHA receives no points for a unit mix of less than 14% public
housing units.198 Past experience suggests that many developments can
support percentage mixes significantly higher than these. Though market
conditions will ultimately dictate the number, size, and type of units at the
revitalized site, past HOPE VI experience suggests that the revitalized
developments are able to support a relatively high level of affordable units.
For example, a HOPE VI development in Atlanta consists of 40% market rate
units, 40% public housing units, and 20% tax credit units. A development in
New Haven contains an even greater number of affordable units with 10%
market rate, 68% public housing, and 22% tax credit units.199
In order to ensure the best use of available resources, the program should
provide incentives to rehabilitate existing housing, rather than demolishing it,
whenever doing so is an appropriate means of maintaining viable affordable
housing stock. For example, the Cuyahoga Metro Housing Authority
(“CMHA”) used its 1994 HOPE VI grant to implement a plan that did not
include the demolition of buildings, but instead sought to refurbish the
structures with new bathrooms, larger units, new landscaping, and new street
198. Id. at 49,783 (Part XIV(A)(1)-(4)).
199. Carpenter, supra note 193, at 1099.
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locations.200 After the revitalization was complete, the total number of
available units remained virtually the same as had been available before the
revitalization.201 This HOPE VI success reveals that demolition is not always
necessary to revitalize severely distressed public housing and that it is possible
to maintain, rather than reduce, the number of units in the public housing
stock. As part of the application process, a determination should be made
regarding whether wholesale demolition and rebuilding is necessary or whether
selective, localized redesign can serve revitalization goals just as effectively.202
Finally, although the current HOPE VI program does reward applicants who
plan off-site replacement units,203 such construction should receive greater
emphasis. An example from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, illustrates how
incentives to replace demolished units with more off-site construction can
actually further fair housing goals. The revitalization of McKees Rocks
Terrace, a public housing complex on the outskirts of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
involved not only on-site redevelopment, but also a new 60-unit rental
development in a nearby suburb.204 The suburban development allowed public
housing residents the chance to relocate to a community with better public
schools, access to employment, and improved public safety.205 Although
“finding appropriate sites and obtaining local approvals is risky and
challenging for any developer attempting to build low-income housing in
suburban settings,” such effort needs to be an intregal part of any HOPE VI
revitalization plan in order to bring about expanded housing opportunities.206
Applicants who voluntarily choose to undertake a one-for-one replacement that
includes both off-site and on-site replacement units should be given a high
degree of consideration.207
In addition to encouraging a greater number of affordable units to remain
in the housing stock, the program should also encourage the construction of
units that are appropriate in size and type. For example, in order to ensure that
units that will accommodate larger families are included in the HOPE VI plan,
the scoring structure should award points for plans that include some specified
percentage of larger public housing units. Further, the scoring structure
currently rewards developers for including homeownership sites within the

200. FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 440.
201. Id.
202. Carpenter, supra note 193, at 1126-27.
203. See July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,783-84.
204. Clancy & Quigley, supra note 184, at 532.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 533.
207. Cunningham, supra note 178, at 364 (arguing that this may especially be possible in an
area that has already begun to move toward revitalization and has begun to attract investor
interest).
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revitalized development.208 However, traditional homeownership might not be
an effective option for many low-income families who cannot afford the down
payment or who do not have sufficient credit to qualify for a reasonable
interest rate.209 Perhaps this problem can be partly remedied by a commitment
from grant recipients to provide substantial homeownership education and
financial assistance in procuring money for the down payment. Or perhaps
other forms of ownership (such as cooperatives or condominiums) could be
used instead of the traditional fee simple concept to reduce the cost of
ownership.210 Maintaining a high level of units that are appropriate in size and
type for public housing residents who wish to return will help to reduce the
disparate impact created by implementation of a given HOPE VI plan.
C. Strengthening the Commitment to CSS Activities
Because facilities such as schools, community centers, and job training
centers can help to create and sustain ideal HOPE VI mixed-income
communities, an essential final modification to the program is one that
addresses this reality. It would be a mistake to ignore the significant impact a
commitment to sustained CSS activities can have on the failure or success of a
revitalized community.211 Managers of HOPE VI properties must be
committed to community building, recognizing that CSS activities “promote
self-sufficiency, provide learning opportunities for children, and play a part in
the mission of serving the neighborhood.”212 CSS activities are an integral part
of a revitalization process that seeks to not only address a community’s

208. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,784.
209. Ammann, supra note 174, at 314.
210. Salsich, supra note 169, at 1643-44. Salsich notes that the cooperative may be a
workable concept for very low-income families, particularly if they are adequately subsidized
with social services, educational, and employment opportunities. He argues that locating such
entities in mixed-income settings can also be an important part of their success. Id.
211. The Commission’s report repeatedly emphasized the need for both physical and nonphysical improvements. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 46 (“severely distressed public
housing is not simply a matter of deteriorating physical conditions; it is more importantly one of a
deteriorating—severely distressed—population in need of a multitude of services and immediate
attention” and “[n]o successful strategy for addressing the conditions in severely distressed public
housing can ignore the support service needs of public housing residents.”). See also id. at 3
(“the Commission believes that these programs and activities will not succeed unless components
that make education and training opportunities available, assist residents to become job-ready,
provide permanent job opportunities, and put money into the pockets of residents are
prominent.”).
212. Myerson, supra note 194, at 4 (recording remarks made by Tina Narr, administrator for
HOPE VI Community and Supportive Services with the Seattle Housing Authority, during a
presentation on the redevelopment of the NewHolly community located in southeast Seattle on
the grounds of the former Holly Park public housing project).
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physical needs, but also its long-term economic and social needs.213
Successful HOPE VI projects, such as the CMHA project described above,
provide for a strong collection of social and educational services as part of
their CSS activities component. For example, under the CMHA plan, HOPE
VI funds were used to create and staff a mall of social service agencies by
using VISTA volunteers.214 The social service mall is available to all
neighborhood residents, most of whom live below the poverty line, and
provides services such as job training and day care.215 In St. Louis, urban
developer McCormack Baron builds sustainable communities through its
nonprofit arm, known as Urban Strategies, which enables it to address the
socio-economic aspects of its development activities.216 Urban Strategies’
revitalization activities in the Murphy Park development included the
redevelopment of the Jefferson Elementary School to serve students in the
neighborhood, provide access to computer networks, and offer job training for
parents.217 In Atlanta, a revitalized development known as the Villages of East
Lake includes a new charter elementary school, a preschool, a YMCA, park
space, and a public golf course that provides a year-round after-school program
for children from East Lake.218 These examples not only demonstrate how
HOPE VI funding can be used to empower an entire community, but also
reflect the importance of a solid commitment to CSS activities.
To be effective, CSS activities such as those described above must be
sustainable,219 necessitating that the funds and staff necessary to ensure their
long-term success be addressed as a part of any HOPE VI revitalization
project.220 Because one goal of the HOPE VI program is to improve the lives
of public housing residents who currently reside in severely distressed public
housing, the CSS activities provision should be strengthened by modifying the
scoring structure to ensure the long-term survival of CSS programs. First, in

213. Currently, up to 15% of the total grant may be used to pay the costs of CSS activities.
July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,778. Under the July 2002 NOFA, all successful applicants
are required to establish Neighborhood Networks Centers (on-site access to computer and training
resources), but there do not appear to be any other required CSS activities.
214. FitzPatrick, supra note 11, at 440.
215. Id. at 441.
216. Myerson, supra note 194, at 3.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 5.
219. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,779 (noting that “CSS Programs must be carefully
planned so that they will be sustainable after the HOPE VI grant period ends.”).
220. Myerson identified several ingredients necessary for a sustainable CSS component: a
long-term funding strategy, sustainable tenants (for example, YMCA, city parks and recreation
programs, family support and health care providers, or education and training programs),
involvement of the private sector (for example, mentors, funding sources, or employers), input
from the community about its needs and interests, meeting spaces, educational opportunities, and
employment assistance. Myerson, supra note 194, at 6,
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order to ensure that supportive activities continue even after the grant period
has ended, the applicant should demonstrate it has secured a long-term
commitment from a support provider. Additionally, an applicant must be able
to demonstrate that it has a strategy in place to ensure long-term funding of the
support activity.221 Second, applicants should be able to demonstrate that they
have a tracking mechanism in place to ensure that all residents in the affected
development have the opportunity to learn about available CSS programs. If a
local PHA makes little effort to ensure all qualifying residents (including those
who resided in the development before revitalization)222 receive the benefit of
CSS activities, the government’s FHA justification regarding its legitimate
interest in the self-sufficiency of its citizens loses some of its credibility.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though the use of legitimate government purpose might well overcome the
FHA disparate impact problem that arises in the HOPE VI context, the broader
tension between the goals of furthering fair housing and revitalizing distressed
communities is not erased. As policy makers continue to grapple with how
best to effectuate these goals, they should recognize that HOPE VI itself can be
a very effective housing policy tool if it is able to “embrace a vision much
greater than simply removing distressed high-rise towers and dilapidated
barrack-style public housing on the site itself.”223 However, decades of
government-sanctioned discrimination that have resulted in unfair housing
practices and segregated living patterns cannot be overcome by a single
program. HOPE VI is not a perfect solution to the housing crisis in this
country, but it does provide many viable and workable solutions to remedy
past housing mistakes. Interestingly, there have historically been two
traditional opposing approaches to tackling the problem of poverty: investing
in the poverty-plagued community in an attempt to improve the lives of the

221. Currently, applicants receive one point for demonstrating a strong commitment from
experienced organizations and service providers. July 2002 NOFA, supra note 58, at 49,780.
Sustained funding is not addressed in the ranking structure, though the regulations do permit
grant recipients to deposit up to 15% of the HOPE VI grant into an Endowment Trust to provide
CSS activities. Id. at 49,778.
222. Id. at 49,778-79 (stating that “CSS activities . . . must meet the needs of all residents . . .
of the severely distressed project, including residents remaining on-site, residents who will
relocate permanently to other PHA units or Section 8 housing, residents who will relocate
temporarily during the construction phase, and new residents of the revitalized units.”).
223. Clancy & Quigley, supra note 184, at 540. However, some argue that privitization
efforts such as HOPE IV “produce[] an alignment of public- and private-sector interests that
renders ineffective the accountability mechanisms proposed by the privitization literature.” Note,
When Hope Falls Short: HOPE VI, Accountability, and the Privitization of Public Housing, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1479 (2003). The author sees fundamental problems with the program that
make the realization of HOPE VI “remote indeed.” Id. at 1498.
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community members,224 or using a mobility strategy to move people from a
community with limited opportunities to a community with sounder economic
and social structures already in place.225 Using HOPE VI alongside other
housing tools such as Section 8 and the LIHTC program brings great potential
for using these two traditionally opposing approaches in conjunction with one
another.226 Of course, this necessitates that the Section 8 and LIHTC programs
be carefully examined and their flaws addressed. Currently, public housing
tenants who lose their housing because of demolition are generally given the
option of transferring to another public housing site or receiving a Section 8
voucher to obtain housing elsewhere. Though proponents point to greater
opportunities for public housing residents, critics point out that those in the
Section 8 program often face significant discrimination and difficulty in
finding stable housing. 227 As poor and wealthy communities alike continue to
224. Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies, 8 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 11, 11 (1997). This strategy advocates improving living and economic conditions
through targeted community development through the use of community development block
grants, revitalization, self-help initiatives, and grass-roots local initiatives. Id. at 12.
225. Id. at 11. The mobility approach includes concepts such as dispersed public housing,
relocation vouchers, reverse commuting improvements, and regional fair share requirements to
encourage construction of suburban low-income housing. Id. at 12.
226. Id. at 12.
227. Though a comprehensive evaluation of the Section 8 program is outside the scope of this
Note, it is important to consider that the Section 8 program was created under President Nixon,
who favored enabling participants to locate housing in the private market instead of relying on
public housing. See Hendrickson, supra note 119, at 62. Section 8 was seen as a means of safe
housing located in neighborhoods with positive role models that allowed increased access to jobs,
education, and services. See United States Housing Act of 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104-461, at 98
(1996). Proponents argue that Section 8 provides recipients with greater opportunity to live in
more healthy and economically viable neighborhoods. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND
URBAN DEV. OFFICE OF POL’Y DEV. AND RESEARCH, Voucher Recipients Enjoy Much Greater
Choice About Where to Live than Residents of Public Housing and are Less Likely to be
Concentrated in Distressed Neighborhoods, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 1 (December 2000). One criticism
of the traditional Section 8 program is that it does not result in true housing choice because of
continued discrimination and difficulty in finding available apartments in economically viable
neighborhoods. See, e.g., Swope, supra note 2, at 42 (“Section 8 is already squeezed in tight
rental markets . . . and it can be difficult for public housing tenants to find apartments in decent
neighborhoods. In good times, landlords can afford to be choosy . . . [and] most of them prefer
nonsubsidized tenants . . . . The result, housing advocates argue, is that residents are moving
from one ghetto to another.”); United States Housing Act of 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104-461, at 90
(effective housing choice depends on availability of housing, families’ inclination to move,
landlord’s willingness to accept tenants with housing vouchers, and extent of discrimination in
law enforcement). For suggestions on improving the Section 8 program, see Florence Wagman
Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for the 21st Century, 23 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 65, 111 n.242 (2001) (suggesting that the Section 8 program can be improved by:
(1) increasing the fair market rent levels to allow the use of Section 8 vouchers in higher cost
areas; (2) providing mobility counseling; (3) regionalizing the authority of central-city PHAs, and
(4) increasing the search time allotted to Section 8 voucher holders). The LIHTC program has
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rebel against subsidized housing, policy makers will likely need to focus on
more regional solutions to the continuing affordable housing crisis.228 The
value of finding better ways to use housing programs in conjunction with one
another cannot be overlooked. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the HOPE VI
program, policy makers will need to continue to search for the appropriate
balance between effecting the goals of fair housing and bringing about
revitalization in our nation’s distressed communities.
DANA L. MILLER*

faced criticism as well. For a comprehensive evaluation of the LIHTC program, see Roisman,
supra note 25.
228. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Solutions to the Affordable Housing Crisis: Perspectives on
Privatization, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263, 309-310 (1995) (arguing that “[a]ffordable housing
cannot be imposed on communities” and that the NIMBY problem will be resolved only by
effective leadership that listens, includes all affected parties, and searches for common ground
and nonadversarial ways of dealing with the problem). See also Peter H. Schuck, Judging
Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 289,
368 (2002) (arguing that “[u]sing the law to promote diversity in residential communities is
probably more difficult than promoting it in any other public policy domain” and that
“[g]overnment-sponsored dispersal and integration of poor and minority families into resistant
white, middle-class neighborhoods can succeed, if at all, only when done in a small, carefully
orchestrated, and low visibility way.”); Schill, supra note 160, at 839 (“Regardless of whether
whites are motivated by racism or are using race as a proxy for lower socioeconomic status, to be
effective deconcentration efforts must take their views into account. Otherwise, efforts to achieve
deconcentration either will be frustrated by community opposition or lead to the exodus of white
households and the reproduction of concentrated poverty.”); Note, supra note 157, at 1577
(articulating a proposal to regionalize the local property tax in order to promote greater
integration of different income groups because “a system that eliminates the fiscal motive may
prompt suburbs to relax their zoning laws voluntarily”); Id. at 1575 (“A wealthy locality will
rationally seek to prevent construction of multifamily units and other low-income housing,
because the residents of such housing would consume more in local services than they would
contribute in taxes.”).
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